Both pundits and scholars have blamed increasing levels of partisan conflict and polarization in Congress on the effects of partisan gerrymandering. We assess whether there is a strong causal relationship between congressional districting and polarization. We find very little evidence for such a link. First, we show that congressional polarization is primarily a function of the differences in how Democrats and Republicans represent the same districts rather than a function of which districts each party represents or the distribution of constituency preferences.
Introduction
Contemporary politics in the United States is historically distinctive in at least two respects. The first is the ever increasing polarization of political elites. As McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2006) Given the conjunction of these two patterns, it seems natural to draw a link; namely, the increased polarization of Congress is a direct result of the increasing ease of reelection.
Presumably in an era of declining competition politicians no longer feel the need to reach out to moderate and independent voters. Instead politicians are free to pander to their base. Politicians who do not pander may face primary challenges by ideologically purer candidates. In the 2004
Pennsylvania primary, Republican moderate Arlen Specter was unsuccessfully challenged by a conservative candidate sponsored by the Club for Growth. In the 2006 Connecticut primary, Democratic moderate Joe Lieberman was successfully challenged by anti-war candidate Ned
Lamont.
While such a link between increased polarization and declining competition makes sense,
scholars have yet to establish a compelling causal relationship. Some scholars (as well as the pundits) claim that the link between polarization and declining competition is rooted in the increasingly sophisticated techniques deployed during the congressional redistricting process that follows each decennial census. Pundits proclaim that we are in "the age of gerrymandering" (Hulse, 2006 This narrative is attractive not only because of analytical elegance, but because it suggests a single, perhaps even feasible, solution to what ails the American polity: take the politics out of redistricting. Districts drawn by neutral experts and judges would be heterogeneous and politically moderate. Appealing to independents would become the key to winning election, and polarization would become a thing of the past.
Unfortunately, although elegant in description and prescription, the story may not be true.
There are a number of reasons to be skeptical. Certainly individual politicians desire more electoral security. Yet it is not clear that these individual desires lead to more security for all politicians or that the resulting manipulation of districting exacerbates polarization. Despite the increased ingenuity and sophistication of gerrymanders, numerous constraints and obstacles impede using redistricting as an "incumbency protection" plan. The requirements of equal population, compactness, and contiguity reduce the scope of such manipulation. Because many states have relatively few districts, gerrymanderers often lack the flexibility to create distorted districting plans. Legal requirements such as majority-minority districts may exacerbate polarization. But such requirements would be adhered to under other districting mechanisms.
Politicians, moreover, have, in addition to the incumbent protection incentive, a partisan incentive. This was most recently illustrated by Tom DeLay's gerrymander of Texas. The partisan incentive leads to a more basic reason that gerrymandering does not necessarily generate safe seats. Here the majority party in a state tries to maximize the number of seats it wins in future elections. Such a goal leads it to create as many districts where it constitutes the majority as possible. Doing so implies that the supporters of the minority party are packed into as few districts as possible. Ironically, this process leads to more electoral security (and presumably more extreme preferences) for the minority party and less for individual members of the majority party. Consequently, partisan gerrymandering leads to more competitive districts than noncompetitive districts and has an ambiguous effect on polarization.
Not only does the theoretical case for a link between gerrymandering and polarization have holes, there is little empirical support for the claim. That the U.S. Senate has experienced an increase in polarization at the same time as the House suggests that gerrymandering plays at best a modest role. This fact has not deterred writers from arguing either that gerrymanderinginduced polarization from the House spilled over into the Senate (Eilpern (2006) , Theriault (2006)) or that gerrymandering has an additional contribution to polarization beyond the common factors that led to the increase of both the House and Senate. In this paper, we find that gerrymandering has not contributed to polarization in the House. This finding undermines both of the claims.
Our primary findings are:
1. A very large fraction of the polarization in the House is the result of within-district divergence between the voting records of Democrats and Republicans. In other words, for a given set of constituency characteristics, a Republican representative compiles an increasingly more conservative record than a Democrat does. Gerrymandering cannot account for this form of polarization. 
Some of the increase in polarization is

Preliminary Evidence
Despite the conventional wisdom that incumbency-protection gerrymanders have exacerbated partisanship and polarization in the House, there has been remarkably little systematic study of the issue. Carson, Crespin, Finochiarro, and Rohde (2003) Another potential piece of evidence supporting the gerrymandering hypothesis is that during the 1990s the House of Representatives polarized at a greater rate than the Senate, presumably as a result of the 1990's redistricting. This claim is bolstered by comparing differences in party means or medians using common space NOMINATE (Poole, 1998) or adjusted ADA-scores (Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder, 1999 ) across chambers. to intra-district divergence. Although we have constructed both panels such that the difference in party means is 0.9, the two panels show sharply distinct forms of representation.
To formalize sorting and intra-district divergence, note that we can write the difference in party means in DW-NOMINATE (abbreviated NOM) as
The right-hand side of this equation is the average intra-district divergence between the parties.
We abbreviate it as AIDD. When there is positive sorting such that more conservative districts are more likely to elect Republicans, then ( ) ( )
with the difference due to sorting. 4 Thus, we can decompose polarization measured as ( ) ( )
into the AIDD and sorting effects.
Estimating the AIDD and Sorting Effects
Estimating the AIDD is analogous to estimating the average treatment effect of the non- Because these functional forms are somewhat restrictive, we also use matching estimators to calculate the AIDD. Intuitively, these estimators match observations from a control and treatment group that share similar characteristics z and then compute the average difference in 4 Before the 1970s, the "solid" Democratic south represents a negative sorting effect where many of the most conservative districts were the most likely to go Democratic.
NOM for the matched set. We use the bias-corrected estimator developed by Abadie and Imbens (2002) and implemented in STATA (Abadie, Drukker, Herr, and Imbens 2001) .
To visualize the extent of sorting and divergence in actual data, we plot the DW- 
z does not vary much by z (the Bush vote). So estimating AIDD by OLS (under the maintained assumption that assignment of party affiliations is based on observables) seems reasonable. Matching estimates are generally less efficient but are not biased by the non-linearities. One problem is that many of the Democratic districts do not match with any Republican district. Most of these are majority-minority districts. Because the inclusion of "unmatched" districts may affect the matching estimates, we estimate the AIDD on districts whose propensity score for Republican representation lies between 0.1 and 0.9. 8 7 Hereafter we abbreviate DW-NOMINATE to NOMINATE. 8 Crump, Hotz, Imbens and Mitnick (2006) argue for the appropriateness of trimming the observations where the propensity of treatment is less than α or greater than 1 α − . They provide an algorithm for estimating the optimalα . In each biennial sample, we find that the optimal α to be slightly lower than 0.1. But the results are quite insensitive to the exact threshold. The results are also insensitive to the fact that the sample size changes from Congress
The bottom panel of Figure 3 shows the relationship between NOMINATE scores and the 1972 Nixon vote in the 93 rd House (1973 House ( -1974 . Here we see that the difference between lowess curves for each party is quite small. This suggests that there has been a major increase in the AIDD over the 30 years. In addition, the sorting effect has increased as well. Although To show that the patterns are similar when additional conditioning variables are used, we plot the actual NOMINATE scores against the predicted NOMINATE scores from a regression on Bush vote, education levels, percent black, percent Hispanic, median income, and region (but not the representative's party) in figure 4. Again we find both sorting and intra-district effects.
The lower panel shows the results from a similar analysis for the 93 rd House. Again we find that the AIDD is much smaller in 1973 than in 2003.
As discussed above, we estimate the sorting and intra-district effect using both OLS and matching estimators. 9 Table 1 is still the much larger component of polarization. In the next two rows we add additional control variables to the OLS and matching models. These include income, region, and the racial and ethnic composition of the district. 10 The inclusion of these additional variables raises both the OLS and matching estimates. Based on the estimates from the more fully specified models, divergences account for almost 80 percent of total polarization.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
In the lower panel of Table 1 , the analysis is repeated for the 107 th House (2001 House ( -2002 .
These districts are based on districting following the 1990 Census. As suggested by the gerrymandering hypothesis, there is an increase in the overall level of polarization from the 107 th Thus, the sample sizes are occasionally less than 435. There were two districts with opposite party replacements (the South Dakota at large district and the Kentucky 6 th ). The average difference between the Democrat and Republican in these districts was .524. Although this difference is smaller than our estimated AIDD, our estimates do not change if these replacements are treated as additional observations.
House to the 108 th of .021. In a comparison of the models based exclusively on presidential vote, the AIDD is larger in the 107 th than the 108 th . The estimates for the fully-specified matching model are almost identical. This suggests that the overall increase was due to a large increase in the sorting effect, consistent with the gerrymandering hypothesis. But the fullyspecified OLS model tells a different story. These results suggest the AIDD increased by .011, which is more than 50% of the increase in polarization from the 107 th to the 108 th House. This suggests a much smaller increase in the sorting effect following reapportionment.
Does "Re"districting Cause Polarization?
Even if we accept the finding of the matching estimates that produce the larger increase in the sorting effect from the 107 th to the 108 th , it does not follow that the increase resulted from gerrymandering. Such an increase could occur for a number of other reasons such as an increase in partisan voting (see Bartels 2000) . Therefore, we examine whether increases in the sorting effect following reapportionment are larger than those in other years. To test this implication of the gerrymandering hypothesis, Table 2 report estimates of the AIDD and sorting effects for each congressional term since the 1970s, based on the fully specified OLS and matching models.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Both sets of estimates reveal that the sorting effect increased considerably over the 1990s between reapportionments. The matching estimates (columns 5 and 6) indicate that sorting actually decreased in 1993-94 following the reapportionment based on the 1990 census. In contrast, sorting increased in the following two Congresses. According to the matching estimates, the average biennial increase over the 1990s was 0.019, which is almost identical to the increase following the 2000 redistricting. Thus the causal effect of redistricting is approximately zero. While it is possible that the increases in 1995-96 and 1997-98 show a lagged effect of redistricting, the important result is that there is no particular year in each five Congress redistricting cycle that has a sharp increase in the sorting effect. Rather, the increase in sorting appears to be a longer term phenomenon whose origins predate the arrival of computerized gerrymandering.
The patterns for the earlier rounds of districting provide only a little more support for a gerrymandering effect. The OLS results (columns 3 and 4) show that the sorting effects increased more during the redistricting that followed the 1980 and 1990 censuses than in the surrounding years. The matching estimates also show an effect for 1980. But no such effect appears in the matching estimates for 1990. 11 Given that much of the discussion about gerrymandering has focused on the use of sophisticated computer programs to draw boundaries, it is ironic that the largest effect we estimate occurred before the era of personal computing!
12
Even if we accepted the pre-and post-districting changes in sorting as the effect of gerrymandering, the effects are substantively quite small. Under this assumption, the gerrymandering effect is .07 for OLS and .06 for matching. These effects are less than 10% of the total level of polarization and less than 25% of the increase in polarization since 1973. If we "de-trended" these estimates by subtracting the average increase in the sorting effect since the last round of districting, the total effects would be even smaller. 11 It is important to note that even the largest of the year-to-year changes in the sorting effect are not statistically significant given the level of estimation error of the AIDD.
12 Of course mainframe computing was used in districting before the 1980s, but not widely. 13 There have been a number of states with mid-decade redistricting. With the exception of the Tom Delay gerrymander in Texas, these have been ordered by courts to ensure compliance with 
Does Districting Cause Polarization?
Although we have demonstrated that the sorting effect does not increase much following redistricting, it is still possible that polarization is greater than it would be if the districting process were more politically neutral. In other words, districting might cause polarization even if redistricting does not. To explore this possibility, we conduct a number of simulations designed to predict what polarization would be under various districting plans. The first step in these simulations is to estimate ( )
Given the results of the previous section, these can be adequately estimated by OLS with interactions of party and z.
Second, we estimate the probability that a Republican wins in a district with characteristics z;
that is, ( ) p z . We use probit to estimate this function. To capture the effects of estimation error across the simulations, we estimate ( )
E NOM D z , and ( ) p z on a bootstrapped rulings concerning minority representation. In all cases, the number of districts affected has been small. So it is very unlikely that these affected aggregate polarization to any large degree.
sample.
14 After we estimate these functions, we generate congressional districts from smaller fixed geographic entities for which we can observe z. After simulating an alternative districting plan, we compute z for each new district. We then generate election outcomes R or D using ( ) p z and compute NOMINATE scores for each simulated district using ( )
Our simulated polarization measure is just the difference in means from the simulated data. We repeat this process 1000 times for each simulation experiment.
We now describe the various districting experiments.
Random Districting
Due to data limitations, our underlying geographical data is from U.S. counties. A major limitation of this data is that there is tremendous variation in size, ranging from Loving County, TX (pop 179) to Los Angeles, CA (pop 9,545,829). To adjust for size differences and to rearrange these county units into new districts, we subdivide each county into 1000 person blocks (and eliminate counties with lower populations). Unfortunately, we do not consistently 14 One caveat worth mentioning is that these estimated functions are reduced-form estimates of the underlying relationships between district composition and member ideology and partisanship.
Because they are estimated for a particular set of districts, the relationships may not hold under alternative allocations of voters to districts. This problem, however, is one that is endemic to counterfactual analyses of districting. There simply is not enough data to estimate the true structural relationship that would predict partisanship and ideology under any districting outcome.
observe z at the sub-county levels so we must assume that each of these county blocks is identical. As we discuss below, this homogeneity assumption biases towards finding a gerrymandering effect. Thus, our county block data set contains 10 observations for a 10,000
person county (remainders are dropped). Using this procedure, we created 275,584 county blocks.
To summarize, here is what was done in each of the 1000 bootstraps for each experiment:
1. Draw a bootstrap sample from the actual congressional districts.
2. Estimate ( )
E NOM z and ( ) p z using the bootstrap sample.
3. Draw districts from county blocks and compute z for each district.
4. Allocate each district to a Republican or Democrat from a random draw based on ( )
5. Assign a NOMINATE score to each district using ( )
6. Compute polarization.
Our first districting experiment simply randomly allocates (without replacement) the county blocks into 435 districts, ignoring all legal, political, and geographic constraints (including state boundaries). Obviously, this produces 435 districts that are ex ante drawn from the same distribution. Differences between districts will reflect only the random effects on the sampling process. Consequently, the simulated polarization will approximately equal the AIDD.
The darker curve in Figure 5 Figure 5 shows the distribution of the simulated polarization measure across 1000 iterations. Simply adding state boundaries raises the mean simulated polarization to .771. This implies that 33 percent of the sorting effect (Polarization -AIDD) is the result of demographic and political variation across states. And no more than a .096 difference in party means can be accounted for by how voters are allocated within states.
There are many reasons, however, to believe that even this small estimated effect is much larger than the actual effect. The first reason has to do with the limitations of the county data.
Our procedure assumes that counties are demographically and politically homogeneous. In states with large counties, this homogeneity assumption makes it more unlikely that the simulations will produce either very conservative or very liberal districts. For example, the county blocks from counties that have sizeable minority populations but are less than fifty percent minority, cannot be used by our simulations to generate very liberal majority-minority districts. Similarly, our simulations cannot put together the wealthy parts of Los Angeles County.
Obviously, this reduces the chance of simulating high levels of polarization. The second reason why these random simulations overestimate the effects of gerrymandering is that they ignore a number of legal constraints on the districting process. Most importantly they ignore geographical constraints such as contiguity and compactness. Without geographic contiguity, there is less chance for similar areas to be paired together. A block from relatively wealthy Nassau Country New York is not likely to be paired with a similar area from adjacent Suffolk
County. Finally, random districts violate reasonable norms of representation. In the random districting scenario, all districts within a state are approximately microcosms of the state.
Political and racial minorities have little opportunity to elect representatives who share their preferences. Districting systems that take such representation seriously will necessarily produce more polarization than the random districting benchmark.
Geographical Constraints
Although there is little we can do about the effects of the homogeneity assumption, we can roughly estimate the effects of imposing contiguity and compactness requirements. Because of the coarseness of using county data, it is quite difficult to devise simulations of all districting plans that meet these requirements. Therefore, we use two different crude approximations. In the first, we rank order the blocks within each state by longitude of the county center. Then on the basis of this ranking we divide the state into districts from North to South so that district 1 is composed of the most northern county blocks and district k is the most southern. The second experiment is the same as the first except that latitude is used. Both of these districting schemes satisfy contiguity and compactness, but of course they represent just two of the many that do so. Figure 6 illustrates the distribution of simulated polarization measures for districting based on longitude (darker curve) and latitude (lighter curve). The mean polarization score is for longitude is .823 which suggests a gerrymandering effect of at most .044. Although it is substantively small, this difference is statistically significant at conventional levels as only 6 of the 1000 simulation produce polarization scores exceeding the actual value. That is, even though the gerrymandering effect estimated using a simple geographic constraint is much smaller than the effect based only on purely random assignment within each state, the effect remains statistically significant. The results for latitude (see table 3) are quite similar with a mean polarization score of .816.
[Insert Figure 6] 
Minority Representation
Another consideration that random districting ignores is the representation of racial minorities. The random districts are very majoritarian and are likely to produce few AfricanAmerican or Hispanic representatives. To crudely, yet feasibly, capture, the effects of majorityminority districting plans, we generate districts on the basis of their racial composition. The county blocks with the largest African-American populations are placed in district 1, the second highest are placed into district 2, and so on.
15
The solid dark curve in Figure 7 reveals the distribution of polarization estimates. The mean score is 0.832 and the "p-value" with respect to the actual level is 0.012. Again while the difference is statistically significant, substantively the effect is only slightly more than 10 percent of the increase in polarization since the 1970s. This result is hardly surprising. Given that African-Americans represent only roughly 15 percent of the population, packing this population into as few as congressional districts as possible can only explain so much of the national pattern of polarization. Simulations based on Hispanic population or African-American plus Hispanic population generate slightly lower polarization scores. 15 To actually implement a legally sound majority-minority districting plan, we would have to allocate county-blocks differently. Epstein and O'Halloran (2005) suggest that a first approximation would be to maximize the number of districts that are 55-60% African-American.
A full treatment would require consideration of white cross-over voting in each district and the expected NOMINATE score of the district's elected representative of any race.
.
[Insert Figure 7] 
Political Representation
An undesirable feature of randomized districting is that the districts are unrepresentative of diverse interests in each state. Each district is approximately a microcosm of the state so that conservative and liberal interests are not well represented. These simulated districts are also extremely heterogeneous because they are microcosms. Recent formal analyses of districting also question the desirability of random or majoritarian districting. In a model designed to examine the impact of various gerrymanders on policymaking in a majoritarian legislature, Gilligan and Matsusaka (n.d.) show that random districting only produces the policy desired by the median voter under the knife-edge case of a symmetric distribution of voter preferences.
Moreover they show that districting systems that maximize homogeneity of districts minimize the distance between the median voter's ideal point and the legislative policy outcome. Coate and Knight (2006) characterize the "socially optimal" gerrymander. They show that the optimal gerrymander involves a very responsive seats-votes curve. Although our simulations do not produce a seats-votes curve, majoritarian districting systems such as those produced by our random simulations are not very responsive.
To establish districting benchmarks that avoid these concerns about random districts, we conduct two simulations that produce districts representative of the partisan and ideological diversity in each state. The first experiment attempts to replicate each state's distribution of partisanship as measured by ( ) p z (simulations based on presidential vote share yield quite similar results). First, we use our probit estimates to calculate an estimate of ( ) p z for each of the county blocks. We then rank the county blocks on the basis of these estimates where ties are broken randomly. Then we create k districts using the first 1/k percent of the blocks to form the first district, the second 1/k to form the second and so on. This procedure creates a distribution of districts that reflects the underlying distribution of partisanship of the county blocks.
It is important to note that the districts produced are quite different from what we would expect from incumbency-preserving gerrymanders. Under those plans, independent or swing districts (i.e. ( ) .5 p ≈ z ) would be underrepresented. In contrast, partisan representative districting produces many competitive districts.
A related criterion for politically representative districts is to produce districts where the distance from each representative's ideal point to those of her constituents is minimized.
Unfortunately, we cannot implement this criterion directly because we do not observe the ideal point of voters or county blocks. We can instead rank county blocks on the basis of ( )
However, ( ) | E NOM z is very highly correlated with ( ) p z so we do not report simulated districts based on it. We can alternatively rank on the basis of ( )
Because we estimate ( )
with OLS, the rank correlation of the estimates is 1. So we report only simulations based on ( )
. It is worth reiterating that, just as in the partisan case, this procedure produces moderate districts in the same proportion as moderate county blocks.
The solid gray line in Figure 7 reveals the distribution of simulated polarization scores based on partisan representative districts. The mean score is .853, a mere .014 less than the actual level. Almost 20% of the simulations produce polarization scores higher than the true level. So the effect is not statistically significant at conventional levels. As shown by the dashed curve in figure 7 , the results for ideologically representative districts are almost identical. The mean is .856 and 20% of the simulations produce higher polarization scores than the actual level.
The simulation results we have reported to this point are for a single Congress, the 108 th .
To see if redistricting has an effect on polarization, we need to compare a Congress that preceded redistricting with the one the followed. In particular, the estimated polarizing effect of biased districting should have increased after the round of districting following the 2000 Census. 
Did Districting solidify the Republican hold on Congress?
We have seen that districting and, more specifically, redistricting is not a major factor in the increase in polarization. When random districting at the national level was used, almost all simulated districts were competitive, reflecting the nearly 50-50 division of the electorate between the two parties.
Under random districting, the Republicans had a 25 percent chance of winning even more districts than the 229 they actual won in the 2002 elections. This is because, with so many districts being competitive under random districting, the chances of a good Republican draw would be considerable.
Matters change dramatically when we draw randomly only within state. Our simulated distribution of competitive districts peaks around 120 seats (see figure 8) . The demographic sorting of the population into states makes congressional districts much less competitive than they would be if formed from the entire nation. Still, random district formation within state generates far more competitive districts than actually occurred. It also generates significantly fewer Republican seats, an average of 187 across the simulations. The probability of the Republicans winning more than their actual 229 seats under random state sorting is zero (to three decimal places).
The suggestion of a strong Republican advantage from gerrymandering is tempered when we respect geographic contiguity in the latitude and longitude levels. In both simulations, competitive seats fall to fewer than 80 and the Republicans can expect to win over 200 seats.
The "p-values" for the Republicans winning more than 229 seats, rather than being zero, are a more modest 0.108 for longitude and 0.078 for latitude. The longitude results are shown as the solid curves in figure 9.
Forming congressional districts by sorting by race within state (the solid curves of figure   9 ) reduces competition to nearly the observed level but also slightly reduces the expected number of Republican seats over the geographic contiguity experiments. The "p-value" increases to 0.163. Finally, sorting along partisan and ideological lines, in expectation, reproduces almost exactly the actual numbers of competitive and Republican congressional districts with "p-values" similar to those for longitude and latitude. Partisan sorting has a "p-value" of 0.069 and ideological, 0.058. In summary, gerrymandering within states has sharply increased the number of Republican congressional districts over what it would be if districts were randomly formed from county blocks. On the other hand, the increase is much less sharp if other constraints, such as respecting geographical contiguity or creating minority-majority districts, are imposed.
Conclusion
Despite a lack of direct evidence, partisan gerrymandering has become one of the prime suspects Partisanship would appear to make a compelling circumstantial case for an increase in polarization. Politicians are observed engaging in raw power politics to draw districts for personal and partisan advantage. Simultaneously, electoral competitiveness declines in Congress. It seems reasonable to conclude that the two phenomena are related and that the consequence is greater polarization.
But in our search to uncover the smoking gun, the case has crumbled. Polarization is not primarily a phenomenon of how voters are sorted into districts. It is mostly the consequence of the different ways Democrats and Republicans would represent the same districts. Yes, the Holden (2006) find that redistricting actually increases political competition in house races.
Given the focus on before and after redistricting comparisons, neither of these studies rules out a constant effect gerrymandering on the level of competition. But our findings cast doubt on this possibility.
distribution of partisanship across districts is quite different now than it was in 1990, but most of the increase came unaided by redistricting. Finally, as our simulations demonstrate, the levels of polarization we observe are quite consistent with congressional districts representative of the states for which they are drawn. Thus, the scope of districting reform to eliminate polarization is extremely limited. Even if we eliminated districting all together and elected candidates statewide, we could only roll polarization back to the level of the mid-1990s.
Indeed, if anything, we underestimate the ability of blind redistricting to reduce polarization. The relatively blind redistricting used in our simulations will create a large number of districts that are quite heterogeneous with respect to income, race, ideology, and other characteristics. To estimate how these districts would be represented, we have relied on linear models using "average" demographic characteristics of the simulated districts. Research by Gerber and Lewis (2004) , however, indicates that legislators from these average, heterogeneous districts are likely to deviate, in a polarized fashion, from the "average" preferences of the constituents. That is, the AIDD is likely to be greater for a heterogeneous district than for a homogeneous one.
Nothing we say should be interpreted as contentment with congressional districting as it is currently practiced. The protracted political and legal battles over the boundaries cannot help but diminish the legitimacy of American democracy. And redistricting does appear to have a negative impact on electoral competition. There are many reasons to do something about gerrymandering. But reducing polarization is not one of them. Note: Total polarization is the difference in the Republican mean DW-NOMINATE score and the Democratic mean score. Observations where more than one party represented the district in the Congress are dropped, leading to total Ns below 435. In the matching regressions, observations with propensity score less than 0.1 or greater than 0.9 in magnitude are dropped. The OLS regressions are run for the same set of observations as used in the matching calculations. 
